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SELF-INFLICTED VULNERABILITIES
Stephen D. Wolthusen

O

ne of the most prominent, if sometimes controversial, figures in software
engineering resigned in 1985 from the Panel on Computing in Support of
Battle Management of the Strategic Defense Initiative Office, publishing a series
of essays declaring it unlikely that the program would meet the goals implicitly
1
set forth by President Ronald Reagan for the SDI program. Two decades later,
this assessment has gained in pertinence as transformation technologies become reality and reliance increases on network-centric operations and C4ISR*
assets to achieve critical operational objectives. Concern has spread even to the
level of individual tactical units, while the potential persists for damage or at
2
least costly friction and lost options at the strategic level.
While information technology has become a highly efficient force multiplier
in a large number of roles—from producing transparency in logistics flows to
providing target data for strike packages in near real time to guiding munitions
themselves—there are differences between information systems and other engineering artifacts that are dangerous to ignore. As information system components suffuse what had previously been the domain of mechanical engineering,
as well as similar disciplines, these engineering artifacts frequently come to rely
on information technology for their core functionality and hence take on the
properties previously associated only with pure information systems.
Software engineering has made only limited progress in producing large, reliable, and trustworthy information systems. Developing such systems (or even
their software components) that can be mathematically proven, or at least argued convincingly, to be correct and complete is feasible on a relatively small
scale, but it remains, given the consequences of faults, a daunting task at the

* Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
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scale contemplated and necessary for network-centric operations. Unlike in mechanical artifacts, uncertainty in such design criteria generally cannot be ade3
quately compensated for by safety margins. Any effort to develop trustworthy,
high-assurance systems faces limitations as to what can be subjected to independent verification and validation, let alone mathematical proof with the pre4
cision and completeness of requirements and specifications. Success is
extremely rare.
BUILDING FORTRESSES ON SAND
Two examples suggest the gulf in scope between the systems for which capabilities and correctness have been proven with mathematical rigor and those actually used in mission-critical tasks. The Ship’s Helicopter Operating Limits
System, initially deployed with the Royal Navy’s Merlin helicopter on Type 23
frigates, was developed to the standard of mathematically provable correctness.
A highly specialized and experienced team of scientists and engineers required
five years to generate 27 KLoC (thousands of lines of code) of proven and verified software.5 Moreover, there existed a physical system for the software to control, one that could be modeled precisely, complete with kinematic parameters,
and that could therefore be described exactly in a formal specification, from
which code could be derived without ambiguity.
A contrasting example would be a COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) generalpurpose operating system. One of them, Microsoft Windows 2000, contains
more than 10,000 KLoC critical to system security and operational capability;
depending on metrics used, Microsoft Windows 2003 contains approximately
50,000 KLoC. None of that code is modeled, specified, or implemented in such a
way as to permit even evaluation of the trustworthiness of a component running
this operating system, regardless of the characteristics of the layered applications. Interactions between the layered application and the underlying operating system escape, by definition, modeling and specification. Despite advances
in computer science and software engineering, it is not at all clear that such large
demands are within reach of the methods used for smaller systems even if the resources and time for such an effort are not bounded.
This is in large part due to the fact that the complexity of interactions among
software components typically increases significantly faster than the size of the
code base, and it does so in a superlinear fashion (i.e., typically as a polynomial
in the LoC). While strict hierarchical design methodologies and implementations have long been the subject of research, success in the field has been some6
what limited. Even under optimistic assumptions regarding defect rates,
therefore, statistical models predict the presence of several thousand defects for
such a COTS product—even with the additional caveat noted above, that
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unspecified behavior can result in ambiguity as to what constitutes a defect.
Though the Microsoft Windows 2000 operating system has been certified as
meeting the Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level 4 for trustworthiness, critical vulnerabilities are still discovered with some regularity, which is ex7
tremely likely to continue for the lifetime of the system.
Even worse, it is not sufficient even to have individual components with
proven certain security and assurance characteristics; their combination, such as
8
between systems on a network, can still be insecure. Such problems also arise—
at levels of rigor far below formal modeling and proof—from configuration
variations and the introduction of new subsystems (attached devices, new programs, or program revisions) within a single computer system. The ultimate result is a staggering combinatorial problem that simply cannot be addressed by
mere testing, particularly since by definition the types of defects and cascading
failure modes must be assumed to be triggered deliberately by an adversary with
precise knowledge of the information system, rather than obeying standard
probability distributions.
Despite these well known limitations in trustworthiness, assurance, and
manageability, off-the-shelf information technology products—for which
safety and reliability requirements are generally relevant only as far as the civilian market will bear the inevitable increases in cost and decreases in otherwise
desirable features—are increasingly used at all levels in the U.S. Navy, from planning to engineering systems onboard warships. This introduces a significant
number of failure modes that must be considered but are nevertheless frequently ignored with predictable results. A case in point is an engineering network casualty aboard USS Yorktown (CG 48) in September 1997 that left the
9
cruiser dead in the water for about two hours and forty-five minutes. Land
combat systems do not typically have the same levels of complexity—at least,
not yet—but the gap is closing rapidly as new electronics subsystems are added
and internetworked, as in the M1A2 main battle tank.
NO WAY BACK
Even if it were not already established acquisitions policy, fiscal considerations
would dictate that COTS products, or marginal variations on them, will continue to dominate procurement of large parts of C4ISR assets. That is true as
well for critical elements of civilian infrastructure that are increasingly relied
upon for mission-critical requirements. Even if procurement of custom solutions were considered, such alternatives would lag considerably behind commercially available systems in terms of functionality.10
This reliance on commercially available products has already shown its drawbacks in such areas as electronics for weapons systems, where the cost and
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feasibility of reengineering are even less attractive than for purchasing systems
11
reliable for the “life of type.” For software-based COTS systems, the outlook is
even bleaker, for a number of reasons. First, hardware components are traditionally designed to a significantly higher level of quality, not least because errors introduced at the design stage are considerably more expensive to correct than
with software-based systems. Hardware already manufactured with defects may
need to be destroyed, recalled, and, if the defect is found, replaced.
For their part, most commercially available microprocessors have a sizable
number of “errata,” documents detailing known problems and, where possible,
work-arounds. Such errors have occasionally garnered much public attention,
with customers demanding replacement of defective parts. Nonetheless, the incentives for software vendors are somewhat different. For them it is cost-effective
to ship a product with possible, suspected, or even known defects and, by and
large, correct them only when reported from the field. This practice appears to
12
be accepted by virtually all users of COTS products.
Thus, it is frequently possible simply to replace a microprocessor or other
electronic component with a newer, functionally equivalent component as it
reaches the end of its service life. In software-based systems, however, not only
functionality of obsolete and ill-defined software must be reproduced but, frequently, its defects as well. The behavior of the actual system may well depend on
fixes and work-arounds installed in the old equipment.
This situation has led, particularly in the financial services industry, to cases
of decades-old financial software running on multiple layers of simulated operating systems and “middleware” components—not unlike Russian matryushka
nesting dolls. Each of these layers introduces its own defects and uncertainties,
limiting overall efficiency and ultimately assurance. As a result,
Any effort to develop trustworthy, highpresumably, the reliability of
assurance systems faces limitations. Success is
complex software-based systems
extremely rare.
drops. Options to redress this
quandary are quite limited, since frequently when defects and vulnerabilities are
discovered the remedies require configuration changes (for both hardware and
software, the former often necessitating the latter) beyond the immediate corrective measure.
A second, related problem is the tendency of software systems to make use of
the rich functionality available in COTS systems or systems assembled from existing components. The dependencies introduced in commercial systems are
less well known than for government in-house, or GOTS, components. This introduces a further web of unknowns. Situations can result where repairing a defect in one component generates cascading side effects, possibly rendering the
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entire system unusable—even when the components are all from a single vendor. These dependencies produce systems for which the traditional last resort of
“life-of-type buys” is simply not feasible, particularly once vulnerabilities become publicly known; for which reengineering—just as with civilian systems—
is frequently a euphemism for complete redevelopment; and for which assurance in mission-capability declines precipitously over time as new elements and
components are introduced into already underdefined designs.
The alternative of developing and maintaining similarly feature-rich systems
with provably high assurance, however, is likely not to be palatable to decision
makers except under the most dire requirements, and even then it may not be
feasible. An example of such an attempt was the onboard flight control software
of the Space Shuttle program. This software, though far less complex than that
associated with most COTS-based environments and so, one might have expected, less expensive, has cost in excess of a hundred million dollars to main13
tain. Indeed, the very concept of mechanized proofs of correctness has been
14
the subject of intense scrutiny.
SAME TOOLS, DIFFERENT OBJECTIVE
Despite dire predictions implied by these considerations, and although a number
of highly critical situations have been documented, in remarkably few incidents
have malfunctioning information systems led directly to loss of life or similarly
grave consequences.15 The reason may be, however, that systems are being built with
adequate safeguards, and the complexity of critical systems is being limited not because of laws, regulations, formal mathematical methods, or similar engineering
mandates but because engineers are aware of such warnings as those discussed
16
here about software safety and reliability.
However, there exists a marked difference between adequate provision for
failure in the majority of civilian application areas and in defense systems,
whether they are to be relied on in harm’s way or used in supporting roles. Most
civilian systems (with some obvious exceptions such as avionics) can ensure
17
safety by shutting down an information subsystem or components. Such a
“fail-stop” mechanism, however, is not likely to be an option in defense-related
applications, let alone in those used in combat, unless features for recovery and
falling back on manual emergency procedures can be employed.
Traditionally, critical applications without fail-stop options, such as flightcontrol systems, have relied on multiple redundancy and component-based
survivability, as well as fallback. This approach, however, implies significant expense, delay, and a need to codify and validate elaborate operating procedures,
clearly beyond what is feasible. For most defense-related information systems,
one cannot unambiguously demonstrate the effectiveness of redundancy or
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fallback, and in any case the required decision loops are likely to be faster than
even partial manual fallback mechanisms can achieve.
All this implies, especially given the usual circumstances under which defense
systems must operate, that even a system known to be in some degree defective
can be acceptable (for instance, a sensor that occasionally reports false measurements) if the alternative would be downing it and jeopardizing a mission. What
is critical here is to recognize that such failures can and will occur and must be
anticipated at the level of overall mission planning and execution.
Even in combat support missions, such as logistics, where time scales are less
compressed than in combat itself, flaws or failures in information systems can be
extremely detrimental to overall objectives if inadequate consideration has been
given to their possibility. While
clerical errors can be made, and
While information technology has become a
have always been, without the aid
highly efficient force multiplier, there are
of electronic information sysdifferences between information systems and
other engineered components that are danger- tems, the results can be considerably less amusing than the
ous to ignore.
delivery of snow plows and road
salt to Danish troops in Basra at
the height of the summer of 2003. Such errors could render entire missions impossible if the rapid and unchecked propagation of their effects causes large volumes of data to become invalid or even merely unreliable. The lack of fallback
solutions in case of a severe failure of a logistical system, whether caused by an
intrinsic defect or a deliberate attack, can severely affect combat readiness or endanger missions. In the worst case, it might be necessary to open each and every
container and crate to locate vital items, then to ascertain the location and needs
of each unit requiring them.
It is therefore imperative to consider, for each use of information systems, the
faults that could be induced and the effects, both primary and secondary, they
could have on overall mission objectives. This has to be done however mundane
an application seems to be, even for commercial desktop and productivity software. It is precisely the improbable and unanticipated side effect that can cause
the most significant disruption, as no contingency plans are likely to exist. Technical countermeasures can be identified and taken, but information assurance
rests equally on the organizational factors, along with technical prevention,
hardening, and countermeasures. Whether information is delivered electronically or on a scrap of paper is largely irrelevant—if it is accurate, complete, and
received in time.
A corollary to this observation is to partition information systems in such a
way that individual elements to be employed in network-centric warfare (NCW)
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are developed to desirable levels of assurance (presumably through testing and
other verification and validation measures), and independently, to establish baseline capabilities. The additional capabilities provided by the linking and
internetworked operation of such information systems must, given the limitations
in providing assurance sketched above, be treated as fundamentally ephemeral.
ASSURANCE AND INFORMATION WARFARE
Information warfare thus far has clearly not lived up to the expectations raised
during the 1990s.18 While it would be clearly imprudent to dismiss IW as yet another ploy to focus resources and funding through overstated threat analyses—
the threats identified are very real indeed, if somewhat exaggerated—the concept can be carried farther. Information warfare may or may not be useful in the
foreseeable future as an instrument of warfare in the narrow sense of subjugating the will of an adversary to one’s own, because of the potential impact on civilian populations (an impact that clearly makes it a potential instrument for
terrorists or other entities not bound by the Geneva Conventions Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War). Nonetheless, the role of information in warfare can hardly be overstated and has in fact been understood
since antiquity.19 It is precisely in that respect, however, in which forces relying
on network and information-centric systems could expose themselves unknowingly (or worse, having ignored known threats) to new modes of attack.
A design criterion for cryptographic protocols has been proposed in which
the authors assume “the presence of a hostile opponent, who can alter messages
at will. In effect, our task is to program a computer which gives answers which
20
are subtly and maliciously wrong at the most inconvenient possible moment.”
In designing information systems to take account of their effects on mission accomplishment, or indeed their effect on the planning and execution of missions
themselves, the same assumptions need to be made.
Defects in information systems obviously can cause severe damage and disruption even without intervention of an adversary. It is the hallmark of skilled
attackers, however, to identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities in information
systems that, taken by themselves, might seem insignificant. Beginning with
such small openings, attackers will attempt to escalate the damage potential until their objectives have been reached. Sophistication is not always necessary; frequently vulnerabilities exist that make attacks a rather rote, straightforward, and
even automatable matter.
Improving information assurance can therefore be considered a
two-pronged undertaking. One part consists of identifying the mission assurance category for each system and component, as laid down by the assurance re21
quirements. The possible system failure modes, both internal and external, can
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then be identified (using, for instance, fault-tree analysis) and remedies or con22
tingency plans devised.
The other part of ensuring overall information assurance is far more challenging. It requires considering effects on other systems that operate (at least
nominally) independently or at higher levels and devising similar mitigation
and remediation strategies. One might justifiably argue that the onus is on systems “upstream” of the system under review. This argument is valid, however,
only under highly idealized circumstances, since it assumes that a system once
examined is permanently frozen with regard to its potential harmful effects on
upstream systems. To the contrary, and as noted above, even apparently minor
changes can invalidate critical assumptions and introduce new failure modes.
The insidiousness of the problem lies primarily in internetworking effects,
which can also have transitive detrimental effects across multiple intermediate
systems and components. Consider a network with critical systems built upon a
vulnerable COTS base into which a piece of malicious code is inserted—rapid
spread throughout a possibly monocultural information system network can
23
cripple vital operational capabilities. In aviation safety, one frequently hears of
“long, thin chains” leading to the few documented cases of mechanical failure.
Such chains exist in information-assurance failures also, but human and organizational elements must be taken into consideration as well. When information
assurance is considered this way, defenses against information warfare attacks
become a welcome but implicit side effect of overall information assurance,
since there is no need to specify deliberate actions an adversary might take, since
any such action must already have been considered pursuant to the most cher24
ished law of engineering—Murphy’s.
IMPACTS ON NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE
Even in highly asymmetric conflicts, the temptation must be resisted to extract
maximum economies of force on the basis of an assumption that technological
superiority, particularly in information systems, ensures success. There exists a
profound danger that the wrong lessons will be learned, particularly from the
successes of ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. If they are, future plans
25
and operations will be built on highly brittle foundations.
Operations, whether at the strategic or tactical level, should not be predicated
upon the full nominal capabilities of network-centric organization. Account
must be taken at the outset of the considerable spectrum of possible degradation
or complete failure of information systems and other elements, regardless of
cause, but certainly including enemy information operations. Otherwise, missions could commence under overoptimistic assumptions of forces required or
objectives possible; success would then require that the vast majority of
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information system components operate at peak performance for the entire duration of the mission. Plainly, that cannot be safely assumed.
Planning, then, should allow for contingencies that require humans in the
loop at critical junctures to transmit and process mission-critical information
when automated systems fail, and missions should be structured accordingly.
This is, ultimately, the price one has to pay for using highly complex, internetworked systems of low assurance. It also means, however, that the ability to
short-circuit the enemy’s decision cycle may be degraded considerably at any
given time by system failure. To restore overall decision speed and responsiveness, it may be necessary to shift at certain points, if only temporarily, to a hierarchical, pre-network-centric structure, or vice versa.26 Planning should identify
such junctures in advance and explicitly include capabilities that permit information system components to be used effectively even when operating in isolation or only on a small component of the overall network. Ultimately, however,
it is information systems, both civilian and defense, that must change to improve
survivability and assurance, as more and more military systems are designed
that cannot function at all without information components.
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